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Abstract
We identify the degree of intergenerational altruism in an OLG framework a` la Barro ex-
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1 Introduction
The degree of intergenerational altruism is a key parameter in dynamic models with overlapping
generations. It is usually embedded into “Barro-type” preferences of the kind U j +ρU j+1. How-
ever, only a few estimates of such parameter, ρ , have been produced in the literature. Furthermore,
these estimates are typically based on incidental indirect inference in calibration exercises. For
instance, Nishiyama (2002) matches the actual US wealth distribution with the one produced by a
model a` la Barro with Cobb-Douglas constant relative risk aversion preferences; he infers ρ = 0.5,
approximately, when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is set equal to 2. Han and Mulligan
(2001) observe in a similar model that the steady state implies ρ = 0.3, a substantially smaller
estimate, when the annual rate of return on financial investments is 5%. Barczyk (2012) matches
inter-vivos transfers data from the Survey of Consumer Finance in a continuous time economy
with two generations, and he estimates ρ = 0.1 for the young household and ρ = 0.3 for the old
household.
In this paper we provide a direct, structural estimate of ρ exploiting the quasi-experimental
variation in the tax treatment of bequests and inter vivos real estate donations that occurred in
Italy between 2000 and 2001.1 The variation we exploit is quasi-experimental (thus facilitating
identification) because it is generated by tax reforms motivated by the 2001 electoral contest in
Italy, and unrelated to asset prices. Until year 2000 the tax rate on bequests and donations in Italy
had a progressive structure (see Table 2 in Section 3), and was particularly unpopular. On October
13, 1999 the Italian Parliament rejected a bill proposed by the center-right opposition leader Silvio
Berlusconi which, if passed, would have repealed the tax. With a general election looming ahead
in the Spring of 2001, the proposal of the opposition leader was clearly part of an early electoral
campaign. As a consequence, the incumbent government was forced to act and reform the tax:
two weeks later, then finance minister Vincenzo Visco announced at a gathering of entrepreneurs
in Milan that a reform of the inheritance and gift tax would be implemented “at the soonest, and
in such a way that the tax rate will be single-digit”. The government pushed through the Italian
Parliament a reform as soon as the following month (December 1999), during the approval of the
2000 budget. This reform introduced a flat rate of 4% and increased the exemption threshold,
and became effective at the end of 2000. The complete abolition of the inheritance and gift tax
occupied a prominent position in the political platform of the conservative coalition for the 2001
general election. In June 2001, just one month after winning the elections, the new government
led by Silvio Berlusconi repealed the tax. Later on, in 2006, bequest taxation was reintroduced by
the new center-left government led by Romano Prodi, at the same 2001 flat rate but with a very
1 In virtually all fiscal systems, these taxes are effectively unified to prevent the use of donations as a means to
avoid the inheritance tax. Therefore, we think of them as a single tax and refer, henceforth, to the “bequest tax”.
2
high exemption threshold relative to the past, making the tax little more than symbolic—because
of such a high threshold, the average tax rate is still virtually zero.2
In order to exploit these events to estimate ρ , we built a unique panel data set from a variety
of sources and containing information on house prices, the housing stock, and non-housing con-
sumption for the 13 largest cities in Italy over the period 1993-2004. We structure our empirical
investigation around a stylized OLG model in which individuals may either sell their assets or
donate them to their offspring. The model formalizes a mechanism through which the bequest
tax affects market and non-market real estate transactions and so the dynamics of house prices.
The use of a model with both house sales and house donations is motivated by the data reported
in Figure 1. As the figure shows, when the bequest tax rate was sharply reduced, the number of
donations per household increased almost threefold, to unprecedented levels, while sales slowed
down.
Figure 1: Bequest tax rate, donations, and sales in Italy, 1993–2004.
Notes: Average bequest tax rate in Italy (obtained by integrating the tax rates across the tax brackets with respect to
the empirical distribution of house prices reported in the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth)
between 1993 and 2004, and donations and sales per household in the 13 largest Italian cities. See Section 3 for more
details.
The key implication of the model for the purpose of identifying ρ is that, ceteris paribus, house
prices change when the bequest tax rate is altered if and only if ρ is non-zero. We calibrate the
model to show that it reproduces house price dynamics in Italian cities over this period relatively
2 The distortionary effects of bequest taxation in the US have been investigated, among the other, by Holtz-Eakin
and Marples (2001), Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001), and Joulfaian (2006). The optimal structure of bequest taxation
when ρ > 0, a question we do not address in this paper, was studied by Farhi and Werning (2010). A baseline result is
that in a model with a fictitious dynastic agent like the one we employ here, a zero bequest tax rate is optimal. Kopczuk
(2009) provides an overview of theory and evidence.
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well, and then we use it to identify ρ in the structural asset price equation. We find that ρ is about
0.20. However, as we illustrate later, since the reform may have been anticipated by about a year,
this estimate should be interpreted as a lower bound.
Of course our analysis applies to any asset, not just real estate. We focus on the housing
market for two reasons. First, accurate administrative data on real estate transactions is easier
to find than data on transactions involving more liquid assets. For instance, it is easy to track
intergenerational donations of houses; less so for the analogous transactions involving money.
Second, in Italy real estate are a major medium for the intergenerational transfer of wealth. Cannari
and D’Alessio (2008) estimate that in 2004 the share of household wealth that Italians had acquired
via intergenerational transfers of real estate was 56% of total net wealth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives
the key asset pricing equation to be estimated. Section 3 illustrates the data set. In order to “test”
the model for the purposes of structural estimation, in Section 4 we calibrate the house price
equation and we show that our simple framework fits the data remarkably well. We then estimate
in Section 5 the parameters of the house price equation in our data set, which allows us to recover
ρ . Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Setup
Consider a production economy with overlapping generations living for two periods. Generation
j is a set of individuals (of unit measure) endowed with one unit of labor, inelastically supplied.
Generation j is born at the beginning of period j and leaves the economy at the end of period
j+1. Every generation consumes a non-durable consumption good in each period: c1 j units when
young and c2 j units when old. In addition to these goods, each generation chooses, when young,
how much housing stock, H j, to hold during the entire lifetime. The preferences of generation j
are represented by:
ϒ j =U j +ρU j+1, (1)
where
U j = u(c1 j)+u(c2 j)+ v(H j), (2)
and where u(·) and v(·) denote the utility derived from consumption of non-durable goods and
housing, respectively, and ρ is the degree of intergenerational altruism.3 We assume u′, v′ >
3Additivity of ϒ j and U j allows us to obtain a closed-form solution, but this assumption is not driving our results:
any preferences structure a` la Barro (1974), where a generation’s utility is an increasing and monotonic function of
the entire utility of the next generation would yield the same conclusions.
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0, u′′, v′′ < 0, and ρ ∈ [0,1]. Although we could treat housing like any other asset, we believe
there are good reasons for having it in the utility function: this special asset is both a way of
transferring wealth across time (and so across generations), and the source of a valuable good—
housing services.
When young, individuals split their wealth (labor income plus after-tax bequests and donations
received in the form of housing and non-housing transfers) between current consumption, non-
housing assets, purchase of existing houses and investment in new houses. When old, individuals
split their wealth (savings and housing wealth) between consumption, and bequests and donations
of either housing or the consumption good (the numeraire) to the following generation. Notice that
bequests and donations are indistinguishable in this model, because both occur at the end of period
j+1 (i.e., when generation j is old). The period budget constraints are:
c1 j = w j− s j + p j[(1− τ)Hdonj−1−Husedj ]+ (1− τ)D j−1− iHj , (3)
c2 j = s jR j+1+ p j+1Hsalej −D j, (4)
where w j is labor income, s j savings, R j+1 the interest factor (one plus the interest rate), p j the
price of a unit of the housing stock, Hdonj−1 the amount of housing that generation j receives from
generation j− 1, Husedj the amount of existing (“used”) housing units held by generation j in
period j, Hsalej the amount of existing housing units sold by generation j when old in period j+1,
iHj generation j’s investment in new housing units, and D j the amount of the consumption good
donated by generation j to generation j + 1 at the end of period j + 1—the liquid asset. The
government levies a bequest tax on intergenerational transfers: bequests or donations of either
housing or the numeraire from the old to the young are taxed at rate τ ∈ [0,1]. The tax revenue
ends up outside the model.4
Notice how equation (3) is constructed: Husedj is the number of existing (“used”) housing units
that generation j acquires in period j via both market transactions and non-market intergenerational
transfers. Therefore, generation j must satisfy the following, additional “accounting” constraints
on housing:
Husedj ≤ Hsalej−1 +Hdonj−1 (5)
H j(1−δ ) ≥ Hsalej +Hdonj , (6)
4This an innocuous assumption as the revenue from bequest taxes is typically a negligible portion of the total tax
revenue.
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where δ is the depreciation rate of the housing stock held by generation j. Inequality (5) means
that consumption of housing by generation j cannot exceed the sum of what is acquired via market
and non-market transactions. The meaning of inequality (6) is that generation j decides, when old
in period j+ 1, how to allocate its depreciated stock of housing, H j(1− δ ), between donation to
generation j+1 and resale on the market.
There are two production functions; one for houses, which uses non-durable goods as the only
input and which exhibits decreasing returns,
Hnewj = f (i
H
j ),
f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0,
(7)
where Hnewj is the supply of newly produced housing units as a function of generation j investment
in housing, iHj ; and one for the non-durable good itself, which uses non-housing capital and labor
as inputs, and which exhibits the usual properties of aggregate production functions,
y j = g(k j),
g′ > 0, g′′ < 0,
(8)
where y j and k j are output and non-housing capital per worker, respectively, in period j. We
assume that the new housing units produced by one generation become part of the housing stock
of that same generation. Non-housing capital (capital, for brevity) is created at no cost from the
period j consumption good, and is employed to produce consumption goods at j+1. We assume
that capital fully depreciates in one period, so the law of motion of the per worker capital stock is
k j+1 = i j, (9)
where i j is per worker investment in non-housing capital in period j. As usual, output is split
between households and the government. The bequest tax is the only source of government revenue
in this economy.
We impose the additional constraints Hdonj ≥ 0 and D j ≥ 0 (i.e., bequests cannot be negative)
and focus, in what follows, on the interior optimum for all of the choice variables.5 We also assume
perfect forecast about future house prices.
5This assumption is justified by the empirical goal of the paper: our representative agent is always at an interior in
our data set.
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2.2 Equilibrium
Definition 1 (Competitive equilibrium). The competitive equilibrium is a vector (c1 j, c2 j, i j, iHj ,
H j, Hsalej , H
don
j , H
used
j , D j) such that, given the price vector (p j, R j+1, w j):
(i) Agents optimize:
(c1 j,c2 j, i j, iHj ,H j,H
sale
j ,H
don
j ,H
used
j ,D j) ∈ argmaxϒ js.t. (3), (4), (5), (6), ∀ j. (10)
(ii) The goods market clears:
c1 j + c2 j−1+ iHj + i j + τ(p jH
don
j−1+D j−1) = g(k j). (11)
(iii) The housing market clears:
H j = Husedj +H
new
j . (12)
(iv) The capital market clears:
k j+1 = s j. (13)
Notice that in equilibrium both (5) and (6) are binding—no valuable housing stock goes wasted,
except because of depreciation. Combining these two and (12) we obtain the dynamic equation
that describes the evolution of the housing stock:
H j = H j−1(1−δ )+ f
(
iHj
)
. (14)
It is easy to show that this equilibrium is self-consistent. Denoting the tax revenue by Tj ≡
τ(p jHdonj−1+D j−1) and using (11), we have:
c1 j + iHj +Tj + i j = g(k j)− c2 j−1. (15)
Using equation (4), this yields:
s j−1R j = g(k j)−w j = c2 j−1+D j−1− p jHsalej−1 , (16)
so that equation (15) becomes:
i j = w j +D j−1− p jHsalej−1− c1 j− iHj −Tj. (17)
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Substituting for (9), we obtain:
k j+1 = w j− c1 j +D j−1− p jHsalej−1− iHj − τ(p jHdonj−1+D j−1), (18)
and so, by (3) and (5), k j+1 = s j, which completes the description of the model.
2.3 House prices
Solving the maximization problem for generation j and substituting the first-order conditions for
Husedj and H
sale
j into the one for H j we obtain:
v′(H j) = p ju′(c1 j)− p j+1u′(c2 j)(1−δ ). (19)
This equation has a very simple interpretation: it states that generation j equalizes the marginal
benefit of consuming an additional unit of housing (the left-hand side of the equation) to its
marginal cost (the right-hand side), where the latter is given by the difference between the utility-
weighted cost of purchasing housing, p ju′(c1 j), and the utility-weighted benefit of reselling it
when old, net of depreciation, p j+1u′(c2 j)(1−δ ). A similar equation can be derived with respect
to the optimal amount of donations, by substituting the first-order conditions for Hdonj into the one
for H j:
v′(H j) = p ju′(c1 j)− p j+1ρ(1− τ)(1−δ )u′(c1 j+1). (20)
Equation (20) can be interpreted as the equality between the marginal benefit of consuming an
additional unit of housing (LHS) and its marginal cost (RHS), measured by the difference between
the utility-weighted cost of purchasing housing (first term on the RHS) and the utility-weighted
benefit of donating it to generation j + 1 net of taxation and depreciation (second term on the
RHS).
Taking equations (19) and (20) together, it is easy to see that at the competitive equilibrium
the old generation will choose levels of consumption and donations so that its marginal utility
equates the marginal utility of consumption of the following generation, weighted by the degree of
intergenerational altruism, and after netting out the effect of bequest taxation:
u′(c2 j) = ρ(1− τ)u′(c1 j+1). (21)
Combining equation (21) with the first-order condition for optimal savings s j,
u′(c1 j) = R j+1u′(c2 j), (22)
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we obtain:
u′(c1 j)
u′(c1 j+1)
= ρ(1− τ)R j+1. (23)
Equation (23) summarizes the dynamic behavior of the economy. Since R j+1 > 1 and ρ(1−
τ) 6 1, the right-hand side could be greater, equal or smaller than 1. If ρ(1− τ)R j+1 > 1 then
consumption of the young increases from one generation to the next. If instead ρ(1− τ)R j+1 < 1
then consumption when young decreases from one generation to the next. We will conduct our
structural empirical exercise under the steady state assumption.
Definition 2 (Steady state). The steady state of the economy is characterized by constant alloca-
tions across generations. That is, for all j,
c1 j = c1 j+1 = c1, (24)
c2 j = c2 j+1 = c2, (25)
H j = H. (26)
Since R j+1 is an endogenous price, in the steady state it must adjust so that u′(c1 j) = u′(c1 j+1).
By replacing this condition into (23), we obtain:
R =
1
ρ(1− τ) . (27)
Combining this equation with equations (19) and (22), we obtain the key steady-state asset
price equation for the housing stock:
p =
v′(H)
u′(c1)[1−ρ(1−δ )(1− τ)] , (28)
This asset price equation can be used in combination with the first-order conditions for iHj and
Husedj to determine the steady state level of housing investment, i
H . The latter solves
p =
1
f ′(iH)
. (29)
The steady-state effect of changes in the bequest tax rate τ is characterized by the following
proposition and its corollary.
Proposition 1 (Effect of bequest taxes on steady-state house prices). If ρ > 0 and if a lower
interest rate induces higher consumption in the first period of the life cycle, then the steady state
house price, p, increases as the tax rate on bequests, τ , decreases.
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Proof. Rewriting (28) as
pu′(c1)
v′(H)
=
1
[1−ρ(1− τ)(1−δ )] , (30)
we see that when τ decreases, pu′(c1)/v′(H) must increase for this equation to be satisfied. By
equation (27), a decrease in τ decreases R. Suppose a lower R increases c1 (and so decreases
u′(c1)). Because u′(c1) decreases, the p/v′(H) ratio must increase. Suppose p does not change.
Then v′(H) decreases, which means that H increases, because v(·) is concave. But by (14) this is
possible only if iH also increases. Then f ′(iH) must decrease and, by (29), p increases, contra-
dicting the assumption that p does not change. Now suppose that p decreases. Then v′(H) must
decrease even faster, which means that H increases. But this yields a contradiction too, because by
(29) p must then increase. Therefore, p must increase.
Corollary 1 (Effect of bequest taxes on steady-state housing investment and stock). Under the
same conditions of Proposition 1, as the tax rate on bequests, τ , decreases, residential investment
and the housing stock increase.
Proof. Follows directly from equation (29).
Proposition 1 has a straightforward economic interpretation. For the old, the housing stock can
be employed in two ways: it can either be sold on the market or it can be transferred directly to
the next generation, net of the ad valorem transfer tax. When the tax rate is reduced, there are two
kind of effects. First, standard income and substitution effects. These work in the same direction,
bringing about an increase in donations and house prices. Second, a general equilibrium effect via
the interest rate. A lower bequest tax rate requires, in equilibrium, a lower interest rate because
one must be indifferent, after factoring in ρ , between donating assets and saving (a “no arbitrage”
requirement, see equation 27). However, since in the first period an individual is a net saver, the
effect of a higher interest rate on period 1 consumption—and so on donations—is ambiguous. If,
in response to the general equilibrium effect (lower R), period 1 consumption increases, then house
prices unambiguously increase.6 Notice that Proposition 1 applies to any financial asset the old can
use for intergenerational transfers, as condition (21) governs the optimal trade-off between selling
and donating any kind of asset. We focus here on house prices for the reasons discussed in the
Introduction.
6Notice that, a fortiori, this result would still hold if we had assumed a small open economy where the relevant
interest rate is the (exogenous) world rate of return on savings. In this case, too, an increase in house prices is needed
to restore the equality between the return on housing and the fixed return on capital holdings.
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3 Data set
We collected data from a variety of sources, which we use to construct a city-level panel data set
for the period 1993-2004. City-level real estate prices, market transactions, and residential stocks
come from the NOMISMA data base, a proprietary archive. This data base contains average prices
of new and used residential units per square meter. We focus on the price of a used unit of average
size (this is the notion of residential unit that is consistent with the model), where average size
is taken from the 2001 Italian Census. The housing stock is missing for years prior to 2000, and
missing values are predicted using the coefficients from a linear projection of the housing stock on
city population, city dummies, and a linear time trend for the period 2000-2012. Data on donations
were provided by the Italian Ministry of the Economy. We also use the Bank of Italy’s Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to estimate non-housing consumption. Specifically, we
subtract paid rents from total family consumption.7 All nominal quantities (house prices and non-
housing consumption) are deflated using the CPI, and are expressed in constant 1993 euros. Table
1 contains key summary statistics from our sample, and Table 2 reports the changing structure of
the bequest tax in Italy during the period we focus on. These rates refer to inheritances by and
donations to one’s spouse and direct relatives, which cover virtually all cases. As the table shows,
this tax is characterized by a progressive structure, with the first bracket defining an exemption
threshold. We estimate the aggregate tax rate with the weighted average across the different tax
brackets in Table 2. Specifically, we integrate the tax rates across the tax brackets with respect to
the empirical distribution of house prices reported in the SHIW. The result is an average tax rate of
1.97% until 1999, 0.46% in 2000, and 0% from 2001 to 2004.
4 Calibration
In order to “test” the model before employing it in structural estimation we perform a very simple,
preliminary calibration exercise. The goal of the exercise is to replicate the observed price series in
the sample using the asset price equation (28). Notice that this is enough to check the consistency
between the model and the data because this equation subsumes all of the other first-order condi-
tions as well. Incidentally, by focusing on prices, the calibration exercise produces a model-based
estimate of the effect of the reform on house prices.
We reproduce here equation (28) after introducing the time index t:
7Unfortunately we have no information on house maintenance expenses.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
1993-1998 1999-2004
Pop Stock Price Sales Don’s Pop Stock Price Sales Don’s
Bari 333.3 132.8 87.0 1.869 1.666 320.7 152.7 87.9 2.506 2.455
Bologna 379.2 188.7 120.4 5.148 0.492 372.3 206.4 129.4 7.241 0.827
Cagliari 178.1 63.6 89.6 0.687 0.749 165.9 83.4 86.3 0.975 1.130
Catania 325.0 139.6 61.8 1.747 1.358 312.9 159.3 61.0 2.018 1.950
Florence 383.1 152.6 131.0 4.867 0.498 360.6 176.6 147.7 5.765 0.860
Genoa 651.1 288.4 82.1 8.904 0.418 613.1 318.7 73.2 12.055 0.763
Milan 1314.1 701.3 131.3 22.399 3.261 1263.4 736.7 149.5 33.140 4.800
Naples 1036.6 377.0 84.4 3.389 2.922 1006.7 404.0 91.6 5.567 4.238
Padua 208.6 90.1 103.8 2.897 0.816 205.9 106.1 108.6 3.893 1.263
Palermo 697.9 283.7 70.0 3.909 1.395 688.3 302.5 70.0 2.718 1.976
Rome 2665.6 1189.9 122.1 20.070 2.429 2557.6 1248.6 127.4 37.566 3.874
Turin 929.4 439.9 83.6 22.188 1.216 872.4 477.9 82.9 27.258 1.861
Venice 296.2 110.3 102.4 5.218 0.624 274.3 134.0 124.9 4.998 0.876
Notes: The table reports annual averages of levels in two periods: 1993-1998 and 1999-2004. Legend: Pop = city
population; Stock = housing units; Price: unit price in 1993 euros; Sales = number of market transactions; Don’s =
number of non-market transactions (donations). All figures are in thousands.
Table 2: Bequest tax rates in Italy, 1993-2004: spouse and direct relatives
Legal reference Tax base Bracket Rate (%)
Law 346/1990 Total estate 0–125K 0
125K–175K 3
175K–250K 7
250K–400K 10
400K–750K 15
750K–1500K 22
>1500K 27
Law 342/2000 Estate per recipient 0–175K 0
>175K 4
Law 383/2001 Any amount 0
Notes: The table reports the bequest and inter-vivos donation tax rates in Italy since 1990. These rates refer to
inheritances by and donations to one’s spouse and direct relatives. Rates for all other individuals are higher, see
Jappelli et al. (2014) for more details.
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pt =
v′(Ht)
u′(c1t) [1−ρ(1−δ )(1− τt)] . (31)
Notice the difference between the time index t and the generation index j; equation (28) repre-
sents the steady state of a given generation, and we interpret our panel of annual data as generated
by a sequence of overlapping generations, one born one year after the other (cohorts). Therefore,
each period t describes a different steady state, one for each cohort. This means, in particular, that
ρ must be rescaled on a 25-year basis (half the active life span in the model), as we illustrate below.
Taking logs, we can write condition (31) as:
ln pt = ln
v′(Ht)
u′(c1t)
− ln[1−ρ(1−δ )(1− τt)]. (32)
Assuming a log-log-log specification for the utility function in (2),
U j = lnc1 j +ζ lnc2 j+1+θ lnH j, (33)
we can rewrite (32) as:
ln pt = lnc1t− lnHt +α− ln[1−ρ(1−δ )(1− τt)], (34)
where α ≡ lnθ is an unobserved city effect.8 For the purposes of calibration, we use the first-
differenced version of equation (34) to eliminate such effect:
∆ ln pit = ∆ lnc1,it−∆ lnHit−∆ ln[1−ρ(1−δ )(1− τt)]. (35)
We calibrate the model parameters as follows. First, δ = 0.0275. This value is taken from
Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans (2007), who estimate from the American Housing Survey that
the housing stock depreciates at between 2.5% and 3% per year in the US. A young household is
defined as a household whose head is between 16 and 40 years old. That is, one period in the model
8 Alternatively, one can use a first-order Taylor expansion of the non-parametric utility function around the steady
state of the current cohort, (H∗,c∗1). In this case we can express marginal utility as
v′(Ht)≈ v
′(H∗)H∗
Ht
; u′(c1t)≈ u
′(c∗1)c
∗
1
c1t
,
and α ≡ ln[v′(H∗)H∗]− ln[u′(c∗1)c∗1] in equation (32). These expression follow from the fact that, for any function
f (x) and approximation point x∗,
f (x)≈ f (x∗)+ f ′(x∗)(x− x∗) = f (x∗)+ f ′(x∗)x∗(lnx− lnx∗)⇒ f ′(x)≈ f
′(x∗)x∗
x
13
is 25 years. From the SHIW, we compute the mean of total (durable and non-durable) non-housing
household consumption, using sampling weights.9 Unfortunately, the lowest level of aggregation
at which information in the SHIW is publicly released is the region.10 The best we can do is to
attribute to each city the average household consumption of the region where the city is located.
Presumably, this procedure leads to underestimation of the level of city consumption. However, it
is not obvious that the resulting growth rate is also biased.
In order to calibrate ρ , we draw from the studies mentioned in the Introduction. In Nishiyama
(2002) adult life lasts 60 years instead of 50 like in ours. If we rescale his estimates to take this
difference into account, then ρ = 0.42 when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is set equal to 2
and ρ = 0.33 when this coefficient is equal to 4. Han and Mulligan’s (2001) estimate is ρ = 0.29,
and Barczyk’s (2012) is ρ = 0.12 for a young household and ρ = 0.28 for an old household.
The average of these estimates is 0.288, implying a value of 0.951 at an annual frequency (i.e.,
0.2881/25). These values imply ρ(1− δ ) = 0.925. We simulate the model from 1995 onward,
because the fit is poor in 1993 and 1994.
The result of the exercise is reported in Figure 2. We report in this figure three different price
series. First, the data. Second, the series generated by equation (35). Third, the counterfactual
series generated by this equation when the tax rate is left unchanged. Notice that in the model
prices adjust immediately. Therefore, in Figure 2 changes in the bequest tax rate have a permanent
level effect and a transitory growth effect in 2000 and 2001. Considering that we are using a
very parsimonious theory, the model reproduces the data quite well. In particular, we are able to
reproduce the turning point in the price series quite accurately in most cities. The only exceptions
are Venice and Genoa. The model with tax changes clearly outperforms the counterfactual with an
unaltered bequest tax: the distance with the data, measured in mean square differences, is 0.029
and 0.067, respectively.
The effect of the tax on house prices in the model can be computed by comparing the variations
in log prices in the two situations. These are reported in Table 3, along with the actual change.
The difference between the model’s prediction with the actual tax change and the counterfactual
prediction when the tax rate is held constant is a model–based estimate of the effect of the tax
reduction. As the table indicates, this is 16.2% in 2000 and 5.5% in 2001. Since the reduction
was 1.514 and 0.458 percentage points, respectively, these numbers correspond to a semi-elasticity
of about 11%. This is admittedly a large number. It means that a 1 percentage point reduction
of the average (weighted) bequest tax induces an 11% increase in house prices. In a companion
9The frequency of the SHIW is biennial, with the exception of a two-year lag between 1995 and 1998. All missing
years are interpolated linearly.
10There are 20 administrative regions in Italy.
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Figure 2: House prices: actual and model-generated
Notes: The figure compares the data with two model generated-series: the first is generated by the model when we
consider the actual tax changes; the second is generated by the model in the counterfactual situation of no tax changes
during the 1993–2004 period.
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Table 3: Average variation in house prices in 2000 and 2001
2000 2001
(a) Data 0.049 0.046
(b) Model, with tax change 0.134 0.051
(c) Model, no tax change –0.028 –0.004
Difference ((b) – (c)) 0.162 0.055
Notes: The table reports the cross-city average of ∆ ln pit in 2000 and 2001. In these years the bequest tax rate was
reduced, which implies a transitory growth effect in the two years. The difference between the average variation in the
model and the corresponding variation when the tax rate is held constant (i.e., (b)–(c)) is a model-based estimate of
the effect of the bequest tax reduction.
paper to this one, Bellettini, Taddei, and Zanella (2013), we conduct an event study of the reforms
and produce a reduced-form estimates of about 5%, corresponding to a semi-elasticity of about
2.5%. This is much smaller than the model-based effect. In interpreting the latter, however, one
must keep in mind that there are no frictions in the model—prices adjust immediately. In reality,
housing market frictions are likely to attenuate this impact effect. Therefore, a way of interpreting
the discrepancy between the model-based (11%) and the reduced-form (2.5%) semi-elasticity of
house prices to the bequest tax rate is that frictions (either optimization frictions or market frictions
strictly defined, or both) are possibly important during the adjustment to a new tax regime.
Given the model’s ability to replicate the data fairly well, we turn to structural estimation of
the main parameter of interest, ρ , in this model.
5 Structural estimation
Equation (34) can be estimated on our panel introducing a cross-sectional dimension (i) and inter-
preting α as a city fixed effect. That is, we estimate the following equation by Non-linear Least
Squares (NLS):
ln pit = αi− ln[1−β (1− τt)]+ γ lnHit +η lnc1,it + εit , (36)
where εit represents shocks to the steady state not included in the model. We measure τt as in the
calibration exercise, and we assume that the tax change is not anticipated. If it is partly anticipated
(as the evidence in Bellettini, Taddei, and Zanella (2013) actually suggests) then we should inter-
pret our estimates of ρ as a lower bound of the true degree of altruism. It is a lower bound because
if the reform is anticipated then the reform-induced change in prices from just before to just after
the reform would be smaller than the overall reform-induced price change.
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Identification is facilitated by the exogenous nature of the tax reforms we are considering. As
described in the Introduction, the reforms were motivated by the electoral competition and so were
exogenous with respect to asset prices. Notice from Equation (31) that the underlying time trend
in house prices is captured by the dynamics of the housing stock and consumption. The NLS
estimate of β identifies ρ(1− δ ). Furthermore, the structure of the model generates two testable
assumptions, namely γ =−1 and η = 1. The results are reported in Table 4. The first column in this
table shows that the coefficient on (1−τ) is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient on
the residential stock is also significant, and negative. The coefficient on consumption of the young
is positive but is not statistically different from zero. This lack of significance is likely to reflect
the noise introduced by imputing region–level consumption to each city. The data do not reject the
restrictions the model imposes on γ and η . Both sign and magnitude are in line with the theory.
Table 5 shows that the two structural hypothesis (and a third, implied hypothesis that γ +η = 1)
are not rejected by the data.
One may worry that the right-hand side variables lnHit and lnc1,it are correlated with the error
term in equation (36). In this case all of the coefficients would be biased relative to the structural
parameters they represent. The alternative specification in the second column of Table 4 indicates
that this is not a concern. In this specification the dependent variable is ln(pitHit/c1,it), the log of
the ratio of housing consumption to non-housing consumption. This specification, of course, is
the direct empirical counterpart of the model’s first-order conditions and avoids all potential endo-
geneity problems by leaving on the RHS only the bequest tax rate, whose variations are arguably
exogenous. In fact, this alternative specification is equivalent to a constrained estimation of equa-
tion (34) with constraints γ =−1 and η = 1. Table 4 indicates that our estimate of β is essentially
unaffected. Given that we cannot reject that γ = −1 and η = 1, we take this constrained, more
efficient estimate (βˆ = 0.908) as our preferred estimate of ρ(1−δ ).
We next use such preferred estimate to back out an estimate of the intergenerational altruism
parameter, ρ . In order to do this, we just need a value for the depreciation rate. This can be taken,
as in the calibration exercise, from Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2007). To check robustness,
we let this parameter take three possible values: 2%, 2.75%, and 3.5%. Given a value for δ , our
estimate of β implies an estimate of ρ . The results are reported in Table 6. In this table, our
steady-state estimate of the intergenerational altruism parameter ρ ranges between 0.15 and 0.22,
with a preferred estimate of 0.18.
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Table 4: Estimation of model structure, steady state
ln pt ln
pitHit
c1,it
β 0.892 0.908
(0.023) (0.018)
γ –0.703 –
(0.197)
η 0.443 –
(0.368)
Constant 5.34 –0.153
(3.61) (0.177)
Observations 156 156
Cities 13 13
City fixed effects Yes Yes
Notes: Non-linear Least Squares estimates of structural parameters: β corresponds to ρ(1− δ ); γ and η are the
coefficients on lnHit and lncit,1, respectively. Standard errors are in reported in parenthesis, and are robust to het-
eroskedasticity and serial correlation at the city level.
Table 5: Test of structural hypotheses, steady state
H0 p-value
γ =−1 0.159
η = 1 0.155
γ+η = 0 0.332
Notes: p-values from t-tests of three structural hypotheses: (1) that the coefficient on lnHit (i.e., γ) is equal to –1; (2)
that the coefficient on lncit,1 (i.e., η) is equal to 1; (3) that the sum of the two is zero.
Table 6: Estimates of the intergenerational parameter ρ , steady state
Parameter Description Frequency Estimates
δ Net housing deprec. 1 year 0.02 0.0275 0.035
ρ Intergen. altruism 1 year 0.927 0.933 0.941
(s.e.) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
ρ Intergen. altruism 25 years 0.149 0.181 0.220
(s.e.) (0.075) (0.091) (0.110)
Notes: Estimates of the intergenerational altruism parameter, ρ , at the annual and generational frequency (i.e., 25
years). For given values of δ , the former is estimated as ρˆ = βˆ/(1− δ ), where βˆ is the preferred Non-linear Least
Squares estimate reported in Table 4. The latter, instead, is computed as ρˆ25. Standard errors are computed using the
delta method.
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6 Conclusions
We have exploited a two-step reform of bequest taxation in Italy to identify the degree of intergen-
erational altruism is a basic OLG model. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper in the
literature that provides a direct, structural estimate of such parameter using a bequest tax reform.
The key idea is that the reforms we focus on can affect house prices if and only if intergenerational
altruism is nonzero. We have found that in our model the intergenerational altruism parameter is
about 20%, and that this is a lower bound because of the possible anticipation of the reform. This
direct estimate agrees, by and large, with existing indirect ones.
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